Pandemics and Biosecurity
What pandemic risk actually looks like, what biosecurity infrastructure exists, and the lessons mostly unlearned from COVID.
(IMF and World Bank estimates; uncertainty ranges are wide)
(WHO and Economist excess-mortality estimates)
(Metabiota / Center for Global Development range; figures contested)
A note on framing. Pandemics largely vanished from political attention after the COVID emergency phase ended in 2022-23, even though most of the structural conditions that made COVID possible have not changed and several new ones are now visible. This page tries to walk through the picture as it actually is in 2026: what the threat profile is, what biosecurity infrastructure exists and does not, what specific lessons were and were not learned, and where the science-and-policy debates sit now. The tone is neither alarmist nor reassuring; the underlying empirical record is sobering enough that calm clear description is more useful than either.
What the threat actually looks like
Pandemic risk is not one threat. It is a category of related threats with different sources, time profiles, and signatures. Distinguishing them helps with thinking clearly about what each requires.
Natural zoonotic spillover. Most large historical pandemics, including COVID-19 in the natural-origin hypothesis, the 1918 influenza pandemic, HIV/AIDS, MERS, SARS, and many others, originated in animals and crossed into humans through some combination of close contact, food chains, or environmental disruption. The frequency of spillover has been increasing as human encroachment into wildlife habitats grows, factory-farm scale expands, and climate change shifts disease ecology. The question is not whether more spillovers will happen but which will go pandemic.
Influenza specifically. Avian influenza (H5N1 in particular) is the threat most carefully tracked by public-health agencies. The virus has been circulating in poultry and wild birds for decades; recent years have seen substantial spread in mammals (mink farms, dairy cattle, marine mammals, including specific cases that suggest mammal-to-mammal transmission). As of 2026, H5N1 has not adapted to efficient human-to-human transmission, but the genetic evolution that would allow this is being closely watched. A flu pandemic with current case-fatality rates would be substantially worse than COVID-19.
Lab-related risks. Research on dangerous pathogens has expanded substantially since 2000. Specific gain-of-function research, where pathogens are deliberately enhanced to study transmissibility or virulence, has been the subject of intense scientific and policy debate. The 2014 US moratorium, the 2017 reversal, and continued ambiguity about what counts as "gain of function" leave the policy framework less robust than it appears on paper. Lab leaks have happened historically, including in highly secure facilities. Whether COVID-19 had a lab-related origin remains contested with serious researchers on both sides; the policy-relevant point is that the structural risk of lab leaks is real regardless of how COVID specifically originated.
Deliberate biological threat. Bioweapons programmes are formally banned by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, but verification is much weaker than for nuclear or chemical weapons. Several states have been credibly accused of maintaining covert programmes; non-state actor capability is harder to assess but is rising as biotechnology becomes cheaper and more accessible. AI-assisted protein design and gene-synthesis services, which were industry breakthroughs, are also capability uplifts for would-be biological weaponeers.
Emerging and re-emerging diseases. Antimicrobial resistance is producing slow-moving but substantial damage as bacteria and fungi develop resistance to existing drugs. Ebola, Marburg, Nipah, Lassa, monkeypox/mpox, dengue, chikungunya, and others have produced regional outbreaks that did not become pandemics but could in different conditions. Climate change is shifting vector-borne disease ranges substantially.
What biosecurity infrastructure exists
The international biosecurity architecture has been built across decades and remains substantially incomplete relative to the threat. The components include:
The World Health Organization. Coordinates global disease surveillance, declares Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC), and supports lower-capacity countries. The WHO's authority is largely persuasive rather than binding; it depends on member-state cooperation. The post-COVID Pandemic Treaty negotiations have been ongoing since 2021, with the May 2024 deadline missed; subsequent versions are being negotiated with reduced ambition. The structural difficulty is that genuinely effective international authority would require state ratification that several large states are unwilling to provide.
National public-health agencies. US CDC, UK UKHSA, German RKI, Chinese Center for Disease Control, and equivalents elsewhere. Capacity varies widely. The COVID experience exposed substantial weaknesses in nearly every major agency. Post-COVID reforms have been uneven; in several countries (notably the US under recent leadership changes), the trajectory has been toward weaker rather than stronger capacity.
Disease surveillance systems. Genomic sequencing of pathogens has expanded dramatically since 2020. The GISAID database, the Africa CDC pathogen genomics initiative, and similar efforts allow real-time monitoring of how viruses are evolving. Wastewater surveillance has scaled in many countries. The structural picture is that early-detection capability has substantially improved; the political will to act on early detection has not improved equivalently.
Biosafety laboratory networks. Biosafety Level 3 and Level 4 laboratories, where the most dangerous pathogens are studied, are operated globally. Their safety records have been imperfect across decades. Specific accidents and near-misses (smallpox release in Birmingham 1978, anthrax leak in Sverdlovsk 1979, multiple SARS lab releases in Asia 2003-04) document that even well-resourced facilities have failed. The number of high-containment labs has expanded significantly since 2000.
Vaccine and therapeutics infrastructure. mRNA vaccine technology, which enabled the rapid COVID-19 vaccine development, is a genuine biosecurity advance. The 100-day vaccine target promoted by CEPI (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations) and others is technically plausible for some pathogen categories. Manufacturing capacity remains concentrated in a small number of facilities globally. Equitable distribution remains the under-resourced challenge.
Stockpiles. Strategic National Stockpile (US) and equivalents in other countries. The COVID experience exposed that stockpiles had been depleted and not replenished in many cases. Stockpile rebuilding has been partial.
The COVID lessons mostly unlearned
One of the more sobering features of the post-2023 pandemic landscape is how few of the lessons identified during COVID have produced durable institutional change. The picture varies by category.
Lessons partially learned. mRNA platform technology has expanded substantially. Wastewater and genomic surveillance has scaled. Several specific clinical-trial protocols (RECOVERY trial, others) demonstrated that rapid evidence generation is possible. The 100-day vaccine concept has substantial scientific support and partial institutional backing.
Lessons identified but not implemented. Improved international coordination through binding agreements (the Pandemic Treaty has stalled). Real-time transparent data sharing across borders (still depends on individual national choices). Adequate stockpiling of medical supplies (partial rebuild only). Sustainable funding for the WHO and disease-surveillance networks (chronically inadequate). Strong border-and-quarantine protocols that can be activated quickly (politically difficult). Communication strategies that maintain public trust during sustained emergencies (substantially worse since 2020).
Lessons rejected or reversed. Public-health agencies' ability to issue mandates has been significantly constrained in several jurisdictions through court rulings, legislative changes, and political pressure. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (masking, distancing, school closures) are politically radioactive in ways that make their future use much harder. The investigation of pandemic origins, including the lab-leak hypothesis, has been compromised by political polarisation in ways that make calm scientific assessment difficult.
Lessons made worse. Trust in public-health institutions has declined substantially. Vaccine confidence is lower than pre-pandemic in many countries, including for routine childhood vaccines. The information environment around health is more polarised. The specific institutional capacity in several major countries (US CDC's standing with the public, parts of the European response apparatus) is now lower than before COVID.
The structural pattern is that the lessons that required uncomfortable institutional change or sustained political attention have not been learned, while the lessons that required scientific or technological progress have made real if incomplete progress. This is not a stable equilibrium for the next pandemic.
The H5N1 question
H5N1 avian influenza deserves separate attention because it is the threat that pandemic researchers are watching most closely as of 2026.
The basic facts: H5N1 has been circulating in poultry and wild birds for decades. Since 2020, an unusually transmissible variant (clade 2.3.4.4b) has spread globally, killing tens of millions of birds and increasingly infecting mammals - mink farms in Spain (2022), seal die-offs across multiple coastlines, dairy cattle in the United States (substantial outbreak from 2024), and individual cases in dogs, cats, and other mammals. Human cases have been few and severe; case-fatality in confirmed historical human H5N1 cases has been around 50 per cent, though most of those were severe presentations with limited testing of milder cases.
What would change everything is efficient human-to-human transmission. The genetic mutations needed for this are known; whether and when they will occur in nature is uncertain. The 2024 dairy-cattle outbreak in the United States raised the surveillance level substantially because dairy work involves close contact and produces opportunities for adaptation. Several human cases were detected; none became clusters. The current trajectory is uncertain, and credible researchers disagree about the probability that this specific virus produces a pandemic in the next several years.
What is well-established is that a flu pandemic with case-fatality substantially above seasonal flu would be much worse than COVID-19 in important ways. Flu spreads faster; respiratory infectivity in pre-symptomatic carriers is high; existing flu infrastructure (vaccine production, antivirals) is more developed than for novel viruses but far from adequate for a major pandemic. The stockpile of pre-pandemic H5N1 vaccines is partial and uneven across countries.
The paths from here
Continued elevated baseline risk without major event
Surveillance improves slowly. Periodic regional outbreaks (mpox, Ebola, others) test response capability without becoming global pandemics. The H5N1 watch continues. No major novel pandemic in the next several years. The institutional drift continues without reform pressure.
A second major pandemic before 2035
Probability estimates from the public-health and forecasting communities cluster in the 20-40% range for an event of comparable scale to COVID before 2035. If this occurs against the current degraded political and institutional baseline, the response is likely worse than 2020-22 in important ways. The post-pandemic political shifts are unpredictable.
H5N1 specifically goes pandemic
The most-watched specific scenario. If the virus adapts to efficient human transmission while retaining substantial virulence, the resulting pandemic would be qualitatively worse than COVID. Pre-positioned vaccines and antivirals would help substantially; the time pressure on scaling production would be severe.
Antimicrobial resistance produces slow crisis
Rather than acute pandemic, the slow-moving AMR threat materially erodes the effectiveness of existing antibiotics, antivirals, and antifungals. Surgical procedures, cancer chemotherapy, and standard infections become more dangerous. This is already happening; the trajectory may accelerate.
A lab-related event reshapes biosecurity politics
A confirmed lab leak, biological-research accident, or deliberate event produces sustained political attention to research-and-laboratory biosecurity. Specific reforms (oversight of dual-use research, gene-synthesis screening, export controls on dangerous pathogens) become globally coordinated. This is a real possibility regardless of COVID's specific origin.
Technology shifts the picture meaningfully
The combination of mRNA platform technology, AI-assisted drug discovery, improved genomic surveillance, and rapid clinical-trial infrastructure produces meaningfully better baseline response capability over the next decade. The 100-day vaccine target moves from aspirational to actually achievable for many pathogen categories. This is partly happening; whether it scales depends on sustained investment.
Where serious analysts disagree
Pandemic risk is the most under-prepared major threat
Comparison with the resources spent on much smaller threats (terrorism in particular) shows that pandemic preparedness has been chronically underfunded relative to expected harm. The COVID experience should have closed this gap; the political economy of post-emergency funding has not let it. Without major reform, the next pandemic finds the world inadequately prepared again.
Held by: Bill Gates ("How to Prevent the Next Pandemic"), parts of the Center for Global Development, the Nuclear Threat Initiative biosecurity programme, and the broader pandemic-preparedness community. The case has empirical support and policy traction in some jurisdictions.
Biosecurity restrictions on legitimate research are themselves a risk
Restrictions on pathogen research, gain-of-function studies, and related work risk reducing the basic-science capability that future responses depend on. The right balance involves more transparency and oversight, not blanket restriction. Several recent moves toward stricter controls may be net negative for long-run preparedness.
Held by: parts of the virology and infectious-disease research community, several major science journals' editorials, and a strand of biosecurity-policy thinking. The case is contested; the empirical question of how much basic-science capability matters for response is debated.
Lab-leak hypotheses deserve serious investigation
The political polarisation of the COVID-origin question has obscured that lab-related events are a real and credible category of pandemic risk regardless of COVID-19's specific origin. Several US intelligence agencies (FBI moderate confidence, DOE low confidence, CIA in 2025 low confidence) have leaned toward a lab-related origin for COVID-19 specifically, while four other agencies and the National Intelligence Council leaned toward natural zoonotic origin with low confidence; no agency reached high confidence and the open scientific debate remains split. Reform of laboratory biosecurity is justified by the structural risk regardless of how this specific case resolves.
Held by: Alina Chan and Matt Ridley ("Viral"), parts of the US intelligence community in declassified assessments, several biosecurity-focused analysts, and a growing strand of scientific opinion. Critics including virologists Kristian Andersen and Robert Garry have argued the natural-spillover hypothesis remains better supported by the available genomic and epidemiological evidence; the question is not settled in either direction.
Antimicrobial resistance is the bigger long-term threat
Acute pandemic response gets political attention. The slow accumulation of antimicrobial resistance is producing larger aggregate harm and is much harder to reverse. The agricultural use of antibiotics, the absence of new antibiotic development, and the structural difficulty of paying for antibiotics that are only used as backstop are all worsening the trajectory.
Held by: the AMR research community (Jim O'Neill's UK review, the WHO AMR programme, parts of the pharmaceutical-economics literature). The case has empirical support and political marginality in roughly equal measure.
Public health overreached and lost trust
Specific decisions during COVID (school closures of contested necessity, vaccine mandates beyond the highest-risk groups, communication strategies that overstated certainty) damaged public-health credibility in ways that will compromise the next response. The right correction is more humility about what is known, more honest acknowledgment of trade-offs, and less reliance on coercive tools.
Held by: Vinay Prasad (UCSF), Jay Bhattacharya (NIH director as of 2025, formerly Stanford), parts of the heterodox-pandemic-policy community. The case is contested; some specific claims have been validated by post-COVID review, others have not.
None of these readings is fully right or wrong. What can be said from the available evidence: pandemic risk is real and substantial; the post-COVID institutional response has been disappointing relative to the lessons identified; technology has improved meaningfully but has not been matched by political and institutional progress; H5N1 deserves continued close attention; lab-related risks are real regardless of COVID-19's specific origin; AMR is a slower but possibly larger long-term threat; and the public-health communication and trust environment is now substantially worse than in 2019, which will make any future response harder.
What this means for you
Personal preparedness
Modest practical preparation that does not require alarm. Stay current on routine vaccines, including seasonal flu (which affects pandemic-flu severity meaningfully). Keep a small supply of N95 or equivalent respirators on hand. Know what local public-health resources look like before you need them. Maintain enough non-perishable food and water for two weeks. None of this requires belief in any specific pandemic scenario; all of it is the kind of preparation that turns out to matter when something does happen.
If you are at heightened personal risk
Older adults, people with immune compromise, pregnant women, healthcare workers, and others at heightened personal risk benefit from more attention to current respiratory virus seasonal dynamics, prompt antiviral access, and conservative behaviour during local surges. Specific vaccines (RSV, updated COVID, pneumococcal) are now broadly available and underused.
If you read pandemic-related coverage
Specialised sources (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists biosecurity coverage, Center for Global Development, The Atlantic's pandemic coverage, the Global Health Security Index, several substack-based experts) have been consistently more accurate than mainstream coverage. Mainstream media oscillation between alarm and reassurance has been particularly poor on this topic. Reading scientific source material when major claims are made is more useful than usual.
If you work in healthcare or public health
The post-COVID environment is challenging. Maintaining institutional and personal capacity for the next major event under conditions of degraded public trust and political pressure is genuinely harder than it was in 2019. The work matters; the credit for it is currently low. Keep records, maintain professional networks, and protect your own resilience.
If you vote on biosecurity policy
The unglamorous questions matter most. CDC funding and structure. Pandemic Treaty negotiation positions. Gain-of-function research oversight. Stockpile rebuilding. Lab biosafety. AMR drug-development incentives. These are not headline issues; they are where the actual preparedness picture is being shaped. Politicians who engage them substantively are doing some of the most important work; politicians who treat pandemic policy as ordinary partisan material usually have not done the work.
